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INTRODUCTION: THE POLITICAL PROJECT OF IMPLICIT BIAS RESEARCH

The 2016 presidential election was a coming-out party of sorts for the
concept of implicit bias-and not necessarily in a good way. In answering a
question about race relations and the police during the vice-presidential
debate, Mike Pence introduced the topic. Offering his explanation for why
the Fraternal Order of Police had endorsed the Trump-Pence ticket, Pence
said:
They see his commitment to law and order. But they also-they also hear the
bad mouthing, the bad mouthing that comes from people that seize upon
tragedy in the wake of police action shootings as a reason to use a broad brush
to accuse law enforcement of implicit bias or institutional racism and that
really has got to stop. I mean, when an African-American police officer in
Charlotte named Brently Vincent, an all-star football player who went to
Liberty University here in the state, came home, followed his dad into law
enforcement, joined the force in Charlotte in 2014, was involved in a police
action shooting that claimed the life of Keith Lamont Scott, it was a tragedy.
I mean, we-we mourn with those who mourn. We grieve with those who
grieve and we're saddened at the loss of life. But Hillary Clinton actually
referred to that moment as an example of implicit bias in the police force,
where she used-when she was asked in the debate a week ago whether there
was implicit bias in law enforcement, her only answer was that there's
implicit bias in everyone in the United States. I just think-[crosstalk]What we ought to do is stop seizing on these moments of tragedy. We ought
to assure the public that we'll have a full and complete and transparent
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38PN8XF7F
t. Frank G. Millard Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
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investigation whenever there's a loss of life because of police action. But
Senator, please, you know, enough of this seeking every opportunity to
demean law enforcement broadly by making the accusation of implicit bias
every time tragedy occurs.
This statement-along with the remarks by Hillary Clinton to which Pence
was responding 2-represents the most prominent platform yet on which
implicit bias has been discussed. And, I will argue in this essay, Pence's
statement highlights the failure of the political-though not necessarily the
scientific-project of implicit bias research.
Obviously, the story is a bit more complicated than that. The very fact
that implicit bias was an overt topic of discussion in the presidential and vice
presidential debates demonstrates that the concept has penetrated American
political consciousness. As the New York Magazine writer Jesse Singal says,
"[p]erhaps no new concept from the world of academic psychology has taken
hold of the public imagination more quickly and profoundly in the 21st
century than implicit bias."' The implicit association test (IAT), which is
designed to demonstrate the existence of implicit bias, "is one of the most
famous psychological instruments created in recent history," and "has been
the subject of more recent fascination and acclaim than just about anything
else to come out of the field of social psychology."' On college campuses
throughout the country, students learn about the pervasiveness of implicit
bias. If my classroom experience is any indication, many of these students
come to see implicit bias as the principal lens through which to understand
the persistence of racial (and other sorts of) inequality.
The courts have taken notice as well. A number of lower-court cases
have deployed the concept of implicit bias in applying various doctrines
involving discrimination and criminal justice.' Although the Supreme Court
has not used the term "implicit bias," its opinion in the Inclusive Communities

1. Full Transcript: 2016 Vice PresidentialDebate, POLITICO (Oct. 5, 2016, 11:56 AM EDT),
(emphasis
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/full-transcript-2016-vice-presidential-debate-229185
added).
2.
See, e.g., john a. powell, Implicit Bias in the PresidentialDebate, BERKELEY BLOG (Sept. 27,
2016), http://blogs.berkeley.edu/2016/09/27/implicit-bias-in-the-presidential-debate/ ("At one point,
moderator Lester Holt asked Secretary Clinton if she 'believed that police are implicitly biased against
black people' and Clinton responded, 'Implicit bias is a problem for everyone, not just police."').
3.

Jesse Singal, Psychology's FavoriteToolfor MeasuringRacism Isn't Up to the Job, N.Y. MAG.

(Jan. 11, 2017, 12:18 PM), http://nymag.com/scienceofus/2017/01/psychologys-racism-measuring-toolisnt-up-to-the-job.html.
4.

Id.

5.

See, e.g., United States v. Mateo-Medina, 845 F.3d 546, 553 (3d Cir. 2017) (refusing to allow

consideration of bare arrest reports in sentencing, based, in part, on "research indicating that police are

more likely to stop and arrest people of color due to implicit bias"); Shirley v. Yates, 807 F.3d 1090, 1110
n.26 (9th Cir. 2015) ("Vague preferences are particularly likely to conceal implicit bias, as the district
judge-to his credit-recognized."); Kimble v. Wisconsin Dep't of Workforce Dev., 690 F. Supp. 2d 765,
778 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (finding that "in addition to failing to provide a credible explanation of the conduct
complained of, Donoghue behaved in a manner suggesting the presence of implicit bias").
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case explained that the disparate impact prohibition under the Fair Housing
Act (FHA) "permits plaintiffs to counteract unconscious prejudices and
disguised animus that escape easy classification as disparate treatment." 6
What kind of "unconscious prejudices"? Well, eight separate amicus briefs
filed in that case specifically discussed "implicit bias" as a principal target of
the FHA's disparate impact prohibition.'
In the two decades since the introduction of the IAT, then, the effort by
many researchers to get policymakers and society to take implicit bias
seriously has had many successes. But, as I will argue below, it has failed in
its most important political project.
Note that I referred to the "political project" of implicit bias research.
There is also increasing scientific controversy over that research. Critics have
questioned what, if anything, the TAT actually shows, and whether, even if
the TAT shows the existence of implicit bias, that bias is purely internal or
instead actually translates into actions that treat people differently on the
basis of race or other characteristics.! That scientific controversy is not my
principal focus here, though I do discuss it briefly below. For myself, I tend
to agree that the utility of the TAT as a measure of implicit bias (and potential
discrimination) has been oversold-or at least over-bought by enthusiastic
customers. But whether the TAT is a useful measure is a different question
from whether implicit or unconscious bias exists. On the latter question, an
abundance of evidence, independent of the IAT, supports the conclusion that
unconscious bias is real and significant in the world. Unfortunately, some
commentators have conflated the two questions. As I discuss below, that is
one consequence of the incredible attention given to the AT-and one
indication of the failure of implicit bias as a political project.

6.
(2015).

Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2512

7.

See Brief for the Nat'l Black Law Students Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent,

Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (No. 131371), 2014 WL 7336686; Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Texas Dep't
of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (No. 13-1371), 2014
WL 7405729; Brief of Massachusetts et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Texas Dep't of Hous.
& Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (No. 13-1371), 2014 WL
7405727; Brief of Current and Former Members of Congress as Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance,
Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (No. 131371), 2014 WL 7405734; Brief of Students from the New York University School of Law Seminar on
Critical Narratives in Civil Rights as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty.
Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (No. 13-1371), 2014 WL 7272801; Brief
of Howard University School of Law Fair Housing Clinic and Civil Rights Clinic as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2507 (2015) (No. 13-1371), 2014 WL 7336685; Brief of Sociologists, Social Psychologists, and Legal
Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive
Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (No. 13-1371), 2014 WL 7405800.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 28-32.

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW

40

Vol. 39:1

The political project of implicit bias research responded to the increasing
racial conservatism of the period following the civil rights era. In the 1970s,
1980s, and 1990s, the political process turned against robust remedies for
discrimination.9 Judges followed by reading antidiscrimination laws
narrowly and imposing stringent limitations on affirmative action and other
tools to eliminate entrenched discrimination.' With Bull Connor long gone,
and other flagrant examples of racism increasingly rare, the public and
judicial appetite for aggressive antidiscrimination enforcement seemed to be
disappearing. The lack of appetite was connected in part to the rise of an
innocent-victims narrative, in which antidiscrimination law, and especially
remedies such as busing and affirmative action, were understood to impose
significant costs on good-hearted people who were not responsible for the
injustices of the past."
Advocates of aggressive antidiscrimination remedies thus seemed to
need a new approach. And implicit bias seemed to provide it. In the academy,
in the courts, and in public policy advocacy, researchers and activists have
deployed the findings of implicit bias research to defend antidiscrimination
efforts and to support extending those efforts to new domains. Their political
project responded to the increasing conservatism on racial issues by aiming
to depoliticize and depersonalize society's understanding of discrimination.
The first goal, depoliticization, would be achieved by substituting a
discourse of science for the then-dominant discourse of justice.' 2 Studies
demonstrating the prevalence of implicit bias, researchers argued, provided
scientific proof that racial discrimination persists. To recognize that point,
they suggested, did not require acceptance of a political agenda of distributive
justice." Nor did it require a conclusion that current inequalities resulted
from slavery or Jim Crow-a conclusion that would require resolution of
complex and inherently contestable arguments about historical and

9.

See Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination,"Accommodation, and the Politics of

(Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 902-04 (2003).
10.

See id

11.

See, e.g., Frances Lee Ansley, Stirringthe Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of Civil Rights

Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 993, 1005-23 (1989); Christopher A. Bracey, The Cul De Sac ofRace
Preference Discourse, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 1231, 1242-65 (2006); Thomas Ross, Innocence and
Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REv. 297, 297-316 (1990).
12.

See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of

Affirmative Action, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1064-65 (2006) ("The methodology of behavioral realism
forces the law to confront an increasingly accurate description of human decision making and behavior,

as provided by the social, biological, and physical sciences. Behavioral realism identifies nalve theories
of human behavior latent in the law and legal institutions. It then juxtaposes these theories against the best

scientific knowledge available to expose gaps between assumptions embedded in law and reality described
by science. When behavioral realism identifies a substantial gap, the law should be changed to comport
with science.")
13.

See, e.g., Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the

Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 519-20 (2010).
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sociological causation. It just required "realism" about how the world

actually is.14
The second goal, depersonalization, aimed to respond to the rise of antianti-racism.'" In the United States after the Civil Rights Era, to be accused of
racism is to be accused of a heinous act or disposition. Such an accusation
provokes denial and resistance-nobody wants to think of themselves as a
racist.1 6 The pervasiveness of that denial and resistance undermined public
support for antidiscrimination remedies. Implicit bias seemed to provide a
response to that denial. Not only is implicit bias widespread, researchers
argued, it is something that is nobody's fault. Implicit bias reflects the
operation of automatic functions of our brains-the brains of all of us. Bias
is just hard-wired into us, and to respond to it is not to call out bad actors but
simply to plan for the ordinary foibles of the human condition. Beyond what
Eduardo Bonilla-Silva called "racism without racists,"" we have racism
without racism--or, at least, bias without racism. Depersonalization says that
people should not be upset when others call out implicit bias. To have one's
acts attributed to implicit bias is not to be accused of having done something
wrong. It is to be accused of being human.
The political project of implicit bias research has thus rested on at least
two predictive premises. First, that scientific proof of the persistence of bias
will help persuade moderates and conservatives who believed that
antidiscrimination laws had already served their purpose of addressing
continuing inequalities. Second, that implicit bias explanations for inequality
will be more politically acceptable to the broader public because they do not
involve accusing individuals of racism. To some extent, these premises have
surely proven true. The incredible public, political, and judicial attention
14.

See, e.g., Linda H.

Krieger & Susan

T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment

DiscriminationLaw: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1001 (2006). See
generally Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN.

REV. L. & Soc. Sci. 427, 444 (2007) ("[T]his review should reveal the robustness of the evidence that
much of human cognition can and does occur without introspective access, that such processes

nevertheless influence and guide decision making, that the costs incurred by individuals and social groups
are less at the hands of the malign and more likely to come from the unaware and uncontrolled mental
acts of ordinary people. The law will need to include these discoveries about how the mind (really) works
to be true to Erksine's idea that intelligence about such matters, not just meaning well, is the virtue.").
15.

(July

See, e.g., Jamelle Bouie, Racial Discontent is Rising, But That's Not Obama's Fault, SLATE

15,

2016,

5:00

http://www.slate.com/articles/news-andpolitics/politics/2016/07/racismdiscontentis

PM),
rising but that

s_notobama_s fault.html; Ed Kilgore, David Brooks andAnti-Anti-Racism, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 17,
Anti-anti-racism
2009),
https://newrepublic.com/article/69459/david-brooks-and-anti-anti-racism.

obviously is related to what Jed Rubenfeld called "the anti-antidiscrimination agenda." See Jed
Rubenfeld, The Anti-AntidiscriminationAgenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141 (2002).
16.

See generally Sarah Sobieraj, Jeffrey M. Berry & Amy Connors, OutrageousPoliticalOpinion

and Political Anxiety in the U.S., 41 POETICS 407, 424 (2013) (collecting evidence that "white anxiety
about being perceived as racist is powerful even in nonpolitical contexts").
17.
See generally EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM
AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (4th ed. 2014).
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given to the concept of implicit bias, and to the IAT specifically, is certainly
suggestive.
But think back to the Mike Pence quote with which I began this essay.
To Pence, the claim of implicit bias was very much tantamount to an
accusation of racism. Rather than carefully examining-or even being
influenced by-the scientific evidence regarding implicit bias, Pence simply
resisted it. More to the point, he resisted the efforts to address continuing
inequalities that the claim of implicit bias was invoked to justify.
Pence's statement, though perhaps the most prominent example, hardly
stands alone. The increasing use of implicit bias language by political
progressives has not, in the main, blunted opposition to aggressive
antidiscrimination enforcement. Instead, the same battle lines that were once
drawn around accusations of individual racism, and later drawn around
accusations of systemic racism, are now drawn around attributions of implicit
bias.
Indeed, in some ways the turn to using implicit bias language has given
the advantage to those who resist aggressive efforts to overcome racial
inequality. The focus on implicit bias, as instantiated by the IAT, has given
racial conservatives the opportunity to frame their opposition in scientific
terms-as questioning the reliability or validity of particular studies or
tools-and thus allowed them to draw attention away from the political
underpinnings of their arguments. And the repeated invocation of implicit
bias by political progressives suggests that old-fashioned intentional
discrimination is a thing of the past, when in fact it may simply be better
hidden. Indeed, at a moment in history when overt racism-seen in the
reaction among some to the election of a black president, and in a significant
part of the movement that elected Donald Trump----once again seems a
major factor in our public life, the suggestion that implicit bias is the central
problem may be particularly misleading.
The remainder of this essay proceeds as follows. Part II argues that the
depoliticization goal has failed-and that the turn from a discourse of history,
sociology, and justice to a discourse of science is likely, on balance, to have
undermined efforts to address racial inequality. Part III turns to the
depersonalization goal and argues that assertions of implicit bias trigger a
defensive response very much like the response triggered by accusations of
racial animus. Part IV is a brief conclusion.
18.

See, e.g., Jamelle Bouie, How Trump Happened, SLATE (Mar.

13, 2016, 9:00 AM),

http://www.slate.com/articles/news and_politics/cover story/2016/03/how donald trump happened ra
cismagainst barack obama.html; Ta-Nehisi Coates, My President was Black, ATLANTIC, Jan./Feb.
2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/01/my-president-was-black/508793/; Michael
Tesler, Trump is the FirstModern Republican to Win the Nomination Based on Racial Prejudice, WASH.

POST (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/08/01/trump-is-thefirst-republican-in-modern-times-to-win-the-partys-nomination-on-anti-minoritysentiments/?utm term=.da46457d434c.
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I.
THE FAILURE OF DEPOLITICIZATION

The depoliticization goal of implicit bias research posited that a move
away from a discourse of justice and distribution to a discourse of science
would reduce opposition to efforts to overcome continuing racial inequality.
In part, this goal was a response to the arguments of racial conservatives that
so much time had passed since the end of Jim Crow-and certainly of
slavery-that continuing inequalities could no longer be attributed to
discrimination. To that extent, the depoliticization goal involved taking these
arguments in good faith, and providing facts to demonstrate that
discrimination-in the form of conduct actuated by implicit bias-remains
widespread.'" By focusing on current bias, rather than on the legacy of past
discrimination, advocates of racial reform could perhaps avoid the inherently
indeterminate efforts to explain how much of today's inequality results from
past injustices. And by arguing on the level of fact rather than on the level of
justice or distribution, perhaps those advocates could lower the temperature
around issues of racial inequality. Arguments based on empirical evidence
rather than abstract principle might make it easier for people of diverse
political perspectives to come together to address our society's continuing
problems.
Two leading implicit bias researchers, Jerry Kang of the University of
California, Los Angeles, School of Law and Kristin Lane of Bard College,
capture the depoliticization goal perfectly. They write:
Once upon a time, the central civil rights questions were indisputably
normative. What did "equal justice under law" require? Did it, for example,
permit segregation, or was separate never equal? This is no longer the case.
Today, the central civil rights questions of our time turn also on the
underlying empirics. 20
Kang and Lane explain that many people today "assume that we already live
in a colorblind society." 2 1 "Accordingly," many people believe, "if some
groups underperform in various economic, political, and educational
competitions, those disparities evince not injustice but incompetence." 2 2
Although prior scholarship had challenged this "convenient" colorblindmeritocratic story, Kang and Lane argue that this scholarship was too easily

19. Although he does not base his position on implicit bias, there is an analogy here to the way Kim
Forde-Mazrui constructs his argument for affirmative action. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking
Conservatives Seriously: A Moral Justificationfor Affirmative Action and Reparations, 92 CAL. L. REV.
683, 693 (2004) (drawing "upon principles that are either accepted by opponents of affirmative action or
are widely accepted by American society as relevant to questions of attributing collective responsibility
for the harmful effects of wrongful conduct").
20. Kang & Lane, supra note 13, at 519.
21. Id. at 465.
22. Id at 519.
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dismissed as anecdotal and sociologically contestable.2 3 But now, they
contend, "the convenient story is also being contested with something
more-the modem authority of empirical evidence from the mind
sciences." 2 4 With our "hard data, collected from scientific experiments, with
all their mathematical precisions, objective measurements, and statistical
dissections," doubters will now be "force[d]" to "see through the facile
assumptions of colorblindness."25
But, as Pence's debate statement indicates, the turn to a discourse of
science and fact has not displaced the more hotly contested normative
arguments about racial issues. Consider the statements of the National
Review writer David French, who wrote a piece during the presidential
campaign entitled Hillary's Talk of "Implicit Bias" Should Scare Every
American.2 6 French argued that "[w]hen it moves from abstract to concrete,
all this talk about 'implicit bias' gets very sinister, very quickly" and "allows
radicals . . . to use virtually any negative event as a pretext for enforcing their
ideological agenda." 2 7 French's argument, though couched in pejorative
terms, makes perfect sense from his political perspective. The reason why the
concept of implicit bias has become prominent in public discourse is not
(just) because we are interested in how our brains work. The concept has
become prominent because it undergirds an argument for policy interventions
to overcome racial inequality-policy interventions that have been
exceedingly controversial. Advocates may wish to focus the debate on what
they understand to be scientific facts, but it is to be expected that those on the
other side will attempt to shift the focus to the policy agenda that those facts
are marshaled to support.
If anything, the turn to scientific discourse presents an opportunity for
racial conservatives. Live by the psychological study, die by the
psychological study. The implicit bias political project has, inherently,
focused on a single kind of discrimination--discrimination actuated by
implicit or unconscious bias. And it has focused on a particular tool for
identifying and proving the existence of that kind of discrimination-the
IAT. If there are weaknesses in the scientific case for the IAT, opponents will
necessarily use them to undermine support for the political project of
restoring robust responses to discrimination and inequality.
And, indeed, there are weaknesses. An accumulating body of evidence
suggests that the reliability of the race IAT is too low to draw many, if any,

23.
24.

See id. at 519-520.
Id. at 520.

25.

Id.
26.
David French, Hillary's Talk of 'ImplicitBias' Should Scare Every American, NAT'L REV.
(Sept. 28, 2016, 2:43 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/440503/hillary-clintons-implicit-biastalk-ominous.
27.

Id.
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conclusions from a person's score on that test. 28 There are reasons to question
whether the test is measuring bias against-rather than knowledge of
stereotypes involving, or empathetic understanding of injustices experienced
by-members of minority groups. 29 And there is little evidence that an IAT
score correlates with discriminatory behavior on the individual level in any
significant way"-though there may be more reason to believe that the
aggregate results of the test are telling us something meaningful about
discrimination in society." The creators and popularizers of the test have, in
recent years, repeatedly stressed that the IAT should not be used to identify
the degree of implicit bias harbored by any particular individual, nor should
it be used to predict the degree to which any particular individual will engage
in discriminatory behavior. 32
I should emphasize: It does not at all follow from the fact that there are
methodological weaknesses in the IAT that implicit or unconscious bias does
not exist. The case for the existence-and, indeed, pervasiveness-of
unconscious bias long predates the invention of the IAT." There are all sorts
of reasons to think that biases are widespread and often unconscious. The
minimal group experiments, in which researchers construct groups of people
based on completely arbitrary factors, where subjects quickly prefer members
of their own groups, strongly suggest that unconscious bias against perceived
out-groups is deeply baked into us.34 Linda Krieger describes the findings:
The experiments showed that, as soon as people are divided into groupseven on a trivial or even random basis-strong biases in their perception of
differences, evaluation, and reward allocation result. As soon as the concept
28.

See, e.g., Yoav Bar-Anan & Brian A. Nosek, A Comparative Investigation of Seven Indirect

Attitude Measures, 46 BEHAV. RES. METHODs 668, 676 (2014).
29.
See, e.g., Michael R. Andreychik & Michael J. Gill, Do Negative Implicit Associations Indicate
Negative Attitudes? Social Explanations Moderate Whether Ostensible "Negative" Associations are
Prejudice-Basedor Empathy-Based, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 1082 (2012).

30.

See Frederick L. Oswald, Gregory Mitchell, Hart Blanton, James Jaccard & Philip E. Tetlock,

Predicting Ethnic and Racial Discrimination. A
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 171 (2013).

Meta-Analysis of 1AT Criterion Studies, 105 J.

31.
See Anthony G. Greenwald, Mahzarin R. Banaji & Brian A. Nosek, StatisticallySmall Effects
ofthe ImplicitAssociation Test Can Have Societally Large Effects, 108 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.

553 (2015).
32.

See, e.g., id. at 557 ("IAT measures have two properties that render them problematic to use to

classify persons as likely to engage in discrimination. Those two properties are modest test-retest
reliability (for the IAT, typically between r= .5 and r= .6) and small to moderate predictive validity effect
sizes. Therefore, attempts to diagnostically use such measures for individuals risk undesirably high rates
of erroneous classifications.") (citation omitted).
33.
Charles Lawrence's classic piece on unconscious bias, for example, predated the IAT by a
decade. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987). For an illuminating discussion of the origins of Lawrence's piece,
see Charles Lawrence 111, Unconscious Racism Revisited Reflections on the Impact and Origins of "The

Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection", 40 CONN. L. REv. 931, 942-51 (2008).
34. See Henri Tajfel, M.G. Billig, R.P. Bundy & Claude Flament, Social Categorization and
IntergroupBehaviour, I EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 149, 154-55 (1971).
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of "groupness" is introduced, subjects perceive members of their group as
more similar to them, and members of different as more different from them,
than when those same persons are simply viewed as noncategorized
individuals. Indeed, when offered a choice minimal group subjects prefer to
view information indicating their similarity with ingroup members and their
distinctiveness from outgroup members.3 5

And a lot of evidence suggests that racial bias and race discrimination
continue to be pervasive. The evidence is ambiguous, however, regarding
whether discrimination results from unconscious bias or instead is motivated
by conscious, but perhaps disguised, prejudice or stereotyping. The r6sume
studies, in which employers are far more likely to call back applicants with
stereotypically white rather than those with stereotypically black names, offer
a prime example of continuing discrimination. 3 6 A recent study, in which
subjects responded to a fictional vignette involving a man who gets into a
fight at a bar, suggests that results like those in the r6sum6 studies stem at
least in part from unconscious bias. When the vignette used a stereotypically
black name to refer to the man who got into the fight, subjects perceived the
man as more aggressive, and more physically formidable, than when the
vignette used a stereotypically white name to refer to the man." Additional
evidence comes from a study by Jennifer Eberhardt, Phillip Goff, Valerie
Purdie, and Paul Davies, which showed police officers photographs of
individuals and asked those officers which faces "look[ed] criminal."" The
researchers found that "[t]he more stereotypically Black a face appears, the
more likely officers are to report that the face looks criminal."3 9 Shooter-bias
studies-simulations in which both civilians and police officers are more
likely to shoot armed black suspects than armed white suspects, and civilians
are more likely to shoot unarmed black suspects than unarmed white
suspects-also suggest that racial bias is pervasive and operates at a
relatively automatic level.4 0
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Although that evidence is suggestive of implicit or unconscious bias, it
is also consistent with the existence of conscious, but perhaps disguised,
bias-precisely what the focus on implicit bias tends to obscure. To the
extent that the depoliticization project directs discussion of discrimination to
the scientific validity and reliability of the IAT-a necessarily imperfect
tool-we are likely to miss the very powerful evidence of continuing
conscious bias.
For example, the in-person audit studies of employment, which show
similar widespread bias as that found by the r6sum6 studies,4 1 offer evidence
suggesting that conscious prejudice or stereotypes are at work. In addition to
sending matched testers to employers-the basis for the finding of
discrimination-the researchers also conducted open-ended interviews with
them. In those interviews, the employers were "adamant that race does not
affect their decisions about who to hire . . . ."42 But, "when asked to step back
from their own hiring process to think about racial differences more
generally, employers were surprisingly willing to express strong opinions
about the characteristics and attributes they perceive among different groups
of workers." 43 Those opinions notably included negative stereotypes about
African Americans. Pager and Western found that "the plurality of employers
we spoke with, when considering Black men independent of their own
workplace, characterized this group according to three common tropes: as
lazy or having a poor work ethic; threatening or criminal; or possessing an
inappropriate style or demeanor.""
As Michael Selmi has emphasized, the effects of implicit bias in practice
often shade into stereotyping or aversive racism, so the focus on only one of
these modalities to the exclusion of the others can be misleading.4 5 The focus
on scientific proof of implicit bias may thus be doubly counterproductive.
First, it suggests that the most prevalent form of discrimination is
unconscious, when conscious bias, stereotyping, and prejudice may be just
as important in practice. Second, it suggests that the case for continuing to
respond to discrimination rests on applying a set of scientific standards to one
particular tool that provides one category of evidence for the persistence of
that one narrow kind of bias. And, as I have previously argued, framing these
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issues in scientific terms obscures the deeply-contested normative issues that
we are actually fighting about. 4 6

The focus on implicit bias, far from shoring up the political case for
responding to racial injustice, actually threatens the case for reform by resting
it on a narrow and vulnerable foundation. Turning away from arguments
about justice, distribution, and the legacy of history does not make racial
issues any less political. But it does deny advocates of aggressive responses
to racial inequality of some of their most authentic and potentially powerful
responses. The rich descriptions of current racial inequalities by authors such
as Daria Roithmayr, 47 Richard Rothstein,4 8 and Ta-Nehisi Coates, 49 carefully
traced to an accumulation of distant and recent public and private decisions,
make a far more powerful case for aggressively intervening to right racial
wrongs than do the fleeting "a-ha" moments generated by the IAT.
II.
THE FAILURE OF DEPERSONALIZATION
The depersonalization goal of implicit bias research rests on the idea that
assertions of continuing bias would be more politically palatable if they did
not entail accusing individuals of racism. As Slate writer William Saletan put
the point, "'Implicit bias' isn't an accusation. It doesn't mean you're bad. It
means you're normal.""o Or, as Adam Benforado and Jon Hanson wrote,
implicit bias researchers "are attempting to demonstrate that the conventional
understanding of racism is incorrect-their concern is with something
attributionally less blameworthy, though perhaps no less influential over the
lives and opportunities of its victims."' White people react defensively to
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being accused of racism.52 "Moving beyond a focus on conscious racial bias"
could be a "way to overcome [that] defensiveness."s"
Does it work that way, though? Song Richardson offered some anecdotal
evidence showing that a focus on implicit bias has, at times, enabled law
enforcement officers to overcome defensiveness and buy into efforts to
reduce discrimination.5 4 But let's return to the Pence quote with which I
began this essay. Pence used the language of accusation: Hillary Clinton had
made an "accusation of implicit bias"; she "use[d] a broad brush to accuse
law enforcement of implicit bias or institutional racism.""And that was
something that "really has got to stop."56 To Pence, at least, an attribution of
implicit bias was essentially the same as an accusation of racism.
Left-of-center commentators responded that Pence was missing the
point. Wired's Issie Lapowsky said that Pence "missed the most important
part" of implicit bias research, which Lapowsky described as follows: "It's
not demeaning at all to point out implicit bias. That's the whole idea: The
people who study implicit bias say just about everybody has it, to some
degree, and pointing it out may be the first, best step to beating it."" Slate's
Saletan said that Pence had violated a cardinal rule: "When somebody brings
up implicit bias, don't freak out. Don't get defensive and shut down the
discussion.""
This response to Pence parallels the response that scholarly supporters
of the implicit bias program have offered to scholarly critics of that program.
When Amy Wax and Philip Tetlock criticized implicit bias research as
suggesting that "we are all racists at heart,"" Adam Benforado and Jon
Hanson responded that Wax and Tetlock "seem to have missed the point of
those they are claiming to rebut. They have conflated conventional
understandings of 'racism' with the unconscious biases that situationist
theorists seek to bring to light."o Wax and Tetlock, they argued, were
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engaging in a "backlash" to implicit bias research, carried out through "naive
cynical reactions." 6' In my own work on implicit bias, I have similarly argued
that critics of implicit bias research like Wax, Tetlock, and Gregory Mitchell
often frame in scientific terms what are really normative disputes about what
kinds of conduct should count as impermissible discrimination.62
But perhaps those engaged in this sort of analytic parsing-myself very
much included-are missing the point. The point of implicit bias as a political
project was to provide an account of continuing inequality that was more
palatable to racial moderates and conservatives than prevailing accounts that
focused on corrective or distributive justice. The depersonalization goal of
that program rested on the premise that people will not react as defensively
to claims of implicit bias as they do to accusations of intentional
discrimination. If that premise does not hold true-as Pence's reaction
indicates-then the political project is failing. And it's failing no matter how
much we want people to understand that a claim of implicit bias is not an
accusation of racism. As German Lopez recently pointed out, "While terms
like 'racist,' 'white privilege,' and 'implicit bias' intend to point out systemic
biases in America, for white Americans they're often seen as coded slurs.""
In retrospect, it should not have been a surprise that the
depersonalization goal would fail. Claims of racial bias are highly charged in
our society. For many people who are told that they are racially biased, what
they are likely to hear is an accusation of racism.' This is probably especially
true for those who are most committed to anti-anti-racism-the individuals
who are most sensitive to being accused of bias.
The changing connotation of claims of implicit bias is analogous to what
the cognitive linguist Steven Pinker has called the "euphemism treadmill."
Roughly speaking, the idea is this: when certain words (particularly those
describing less powerful groups) come to have stigmatizing or offensive
meanings, social movements often push society to use new, less stigmatizing
61.
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words. But soon, those new words come to carry the same social meaning as
the now-abandoned ones, and the movements go off to find even newer
words, thus starting the cycle yet again.
One ought not to oversell the point. Pinker's account of the euphemism
treadmill, at least as presented in this simplified form, is overstated. Efforts
at destigmatization-including through abandoning charged language-can
succeed. And the euphemism treadmill idea is often deployed in public
discourse as an attack on efforts to respond to continuing racial, gender, and
disability injustice.66 It is ironic for my purposes, but the notion of the
euphemism treadmill is often a weapon wielded by anti-anti-racists.
Still, the social dynamics Pinker describes ring true here. When racial
justice activists argue that broad swaths of people have implicit bias, and that
we need to respond to that bias by adopting broad-ranging remedies of the
sort that racial justice advocates have long pushed, audiences are likely to
hear those calls in the context of prior arguments by the same racial justice
advocates for the same remedies. And what they hear is an accusation of
racial bias; the notion that the bias is "implicit" and endemic to the human
condition becomes background noise.
In its depersonalization goal, as in its depoliticization goal, the implicit
bias political project is unlikely to succeed. The individuals whom advocates
aim to persuade are not disarmed by claims of implicit bias; they continue to
hear accusations of racism, and they remain defensive about it. Once again,
it seems that there is no way around making an argument straightforwardly
grounded in history, sociology, and justice.
CONCLUSION

Implicit bias research has pursued not just a scientific but also a political
project. Researchers and advocates who urge action to overcome implicit bias
sought to overcome our nation's increasing racial conservatism through
strategies of depoliticization and depersonalization. But the dust-up over
implicit bias in the presidential debates, as well as a close examination of the
premises of the depoliticization and depersonalization goals, suggests that the
political project is likely to fail. Unconscious bias is an important factor in
the world, as is conscious bias, and both are important targets of policy
interventions. But we cannot elide the difficult politics of addressing these
problems by invoking the discourse of science. To gain traction in pursuing
racial equality in the years to come, we must straightforwardly engage the
issues on the planes of history, sociology, and justice.
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